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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\'"ADA

vVELI.J~IAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
''"· GLEN NOBLE and PERRY C.

Case
No. 992

ADA~fS,

Defen(lants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants
to recover damages for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident occurring on July 3rd, 1956
in Nebraska.
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J~ry

Trial was held in Utah ·County, the Honorable
R. L. Tuckett, Judge, presiding. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of
$4,500.00.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial on the
ground of inadequate damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and
moving 'for the new trial on the issue of damages only.
. The Lower Court Orde.red Additur in the su1n of
$3,000.00 "and if the plaintiff and defendants fail to
consent to the additur within 30 days, a new trial is
Ordered on the issu~ of damages only."
Defendants filed a Petition for Intermediate Appeal
to this ·Court, which was granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 3rd, 1956 plaintiff 'vas riding in a Cadillac
driven by her brother in la":' 1\!r. House.· A Studebaker
driven by Mrs. House, "~as travelling ahead of the
Cadillac. In front and ahead of the Studebaker "~as a
pickup truck pulling a house trailer. Defendant Adams,
an e1nployee of Noble, was follo"Ting the above vehicles,
driving a Freightliner tractor and trailer, or tnlektrailPr unit ( T -172).
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The ahove vehieles were proceeding west on U.S. 30,
Deuel County, Nebraska. That high"ray is very narrow
(T-175), only 18 feet \\'"ide, and provides only one lane
of tra.vPl for either \vestbound or eastbound traffic.
The high\Yay is flanked on both sides by grain fields
for many miles (T-105, 171). The shoulders on the high\vay at or near the scene of the accident were only about
3 feet \vide (T-175).
Ada1ns \Yas follo\ving the procession at a distance
of about 200 feet for about 5 miles (T-172).
~lost

of the distance was on flat terrain, but the
group eame upon a series of rolling hills, or dips, or
s\vales (T -171; 105). The vehicles ahead of Adams would,
ten1porarily, move out of his vision as they disappeared
do\vn to\vards the bottom of the hill, \Vhile the trucktrailer \Yas 1noving np to\vards thP smnmit.
Adams, upon reaching the summit, would again
observe the units ahead as they \Vere approaching and
passing again out of temporary view, over the next
summit ahead.
The vehicles ahead of Adams traversed about three
or four of these small dips (T-29) and the relative
distance of about 200 feet \Vas maintained between the
tn1ck and the Cadillac CT-172). The posted speed limit
\Vas 50 miles per hour for truc-ks and 60 miles per hour
for cars (T--176).
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Immediately before the accident, Adams observed
the vehicles again disappear below the summit of the
hill ahead. No brake lights, or other signal appeared
to warn Adams of any change in the speed of the cars
ahead (T-172) (T-195). Mr. House, driver of the car
ahead of defendant, testified he was going downhill
when he applied brakes to slow do"\\!Jl (T-22).
As the truck-trailer was proceeding upgrade towards
the summit, and of course unknown to Adams_, the pickup
truck with the house trailer behind, had run out of gasoline (T-181, 298), and was slowing and pulling off the
road. The Studebaker and ·Cadillac \vere likewise forced
to slow. When the defendant's truck reached the summit, Adams suddenly observed the cars ahead, the pickup
truck partially off the road, stopped with the house
trailer blocking more than half the ""'"estbound lane,
and the Studebaker and Cadillac either stopped or virtually stopped behind the house trailer. The nearest
car, the Cadillac, was only 100 feet ahead (T-177; 196).
An opposite bound car prevented the defendant from
attempting to s"~erve and pass the vehicles on their left
(T-177).
The defendant jamn1ed his brakes and had slowed to
about 10 to 15 miles per hour, "Then the rear of the
Cadillac was struck (T-176; 182). After the accident,
all vehicles \Yere in the bottom of the s"~ale, and they
were shortly 1noved so as not to endanger other vehicles
ap·proaching., \vhose drivers could not see the1n (T-180).
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5
The plaintiff suffered a "whiplash injury" and a
discussion of her injuries will be reserved for the Argutnent.

Defendants in their Answer and in the Pre

-Trial

Order, defended on the ground of Unavoidable Accident
(R-6; 10) in that the defendant, Adams, as a reasonable
and prudent driver, under the circumstances, could not
have reasonably foreseen the events that preceded the
accident; that he was faced with a sudden emergency;
and that he acted reasonably under said emergency, but
could not avoid the resulting accident. Defendants' expert

\\~itness,

Sgt. Laub, lTtah High,vay Patrol, testified

that no vehicle, passenger car or truck, could stop in
the distanre of 100 feet at a speed of 40 miles per hour
(T-211).

That at 40 miles per hour, any vehicle, on level road,
would require a total distance to stop, including reaction
time, of at least 124 feet; at 50 miles per hour 180 feet
( T -211). That if the vehicle were travelling do'vn grade,

it would require more distance (T-213-214).

The Court refused to instruct the jury on any of
the above defenses. (Defendants' Requested Instructions

(R-:27, 28, 30) ) .
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Appellants respectfully submit two points.
POINT ONE
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING ADDITUR TO A SUBSTANTIAL JURY VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT SHOULD BE REINSTATED.
POINT TWO
THE LOWER COURT CO·MMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN DEPRIVING THEM
OF THEIR DEFENSES AND A NEW TRIAL, IF NECESSARY, SHOULD BE HEARD ON ALL THE ISSUES.
ARGU~1:ENT

POINT ONE
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING ADDITUR TO A SUBSTANTIAL JURY VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT SHOULD BE REINSTATED.

T·he Honorable Trial Court concluded in his Order
granting additur, the following statement:
" ... It appears to the Court that the jury
disregarded the Court's instructions pertaining
to damages .... ''
The Pre-Trial Order had framed the issues, previously asserted by defendants' in their Ans\Yer, as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The def(-lndants also contend that the plaintiff received excessive medical care and treatment,
over and above that rPasonably necessary."
.A. reading of the Record and Transcript of the trial,
'vill bear out that defendants contended that plaintiff

magnified her complaints, that she did not suffer \vith
her injuries as grievously as her subjective complaints
""ould have had the jury believe, and that her subjective
complaints, and the symptoms describeid by her, e·pen if
true, could not be a result of the acc~dent .
...

Reserving, for the moment, a recital of some of the
evidence produced by the defendants, \Ve look at the
Court's Instructions to the jury, in light with the: issues:
Instruction No. 10.
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff ... it will be your duty to award the plaintiff
such damages, if any, as you may find ... will
fairly and adequately compensate her.... "
H

"You may award such special damages . . .
not to exceed the su1n of $2, 791.50. You may also
a""ard such sum, if any, by reason of her being
unable to work ... "
"You may also a\vard such general damages,
if any, you find the plaintiff is entitled to for her
injuries . . . you may consider the nature and
extent of the injuries sustained by her, the degree
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and character of her suffering ... .and the extent
to which she has been prevented from pursuing
the ordinary affairs of life ..... The total must
not exceed $35,000.00.... "
Pla~ntiff to our knowledge, made no exception to

this instruction, an.d certa1.:nly dixl not cite it as .a ground
for a new t·rial.

· · . It seems to require no argument that if the jury
is instructed that their verdict is not to exceed a certain
sum, they are obviously being. instructed that they may
bring in a lesser amount, which will "fairly and ade.qua~ely ~ompensate her."
If the jury is instructed, relative to earnings, that
they may award ·such sum, if any, the jury is also being
advised that they may award ·nothing, which is exactly
what the jury did, and with ample reason for their verdict
in~.:·so doing.
··.: We subniit that the ·Court's coining of a phrase, and
concluding that the jury disregarded his instructions,
wi·thout any foundation for said eonclusion, should not
be permitted to stand in violation of defendants' rights
as litigants.
The Trial Court further stated as a reason for granting additur (R. 8) :

" ... it appears to the Court . . . that the
award \ras inadequate in vie\\T of all the evidence
on that i~~ue. It further appears that the verdict
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\Vas given under the influence of passion or prejudice."
\\"'" e invite this If onorable Court's attention to the
t(lstitnony of Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, l\f.D. "\vho was called
by the def~ndants and \\Those testimony in full is found
at pages 255 to 28-± of the Transcript. The follo\\;Jng,
ho,vever, \viii indicate the gist of his testimony.
Dr. Clegg, an Orthopedic Specialist, examined plaintiff pursuant to ('1ourt Order, on February 4, 1960
(T-256). This examination included a "general survey,
checking from head to feet," and special attention paid
to \\There the patient has complaints on the above date:
'~ ...

the patient stated that her main complaint \Vas pain in the neck area with radiation
to,vards the shoulders . . . a dull aching pain,
and at times there were sharp pains ... she had
previously had trouble in her lower back but this
had disappeared ... she 'vas unable to do heavy·
physical activity because of this pain in the ne:ek
. . . she occasionally had some numbness in her
hands a·nd legs."
X-rays \vere taken by Dr. Clegg, 'vhich 'vere negative, and "'vere essentially norn1al for a person of this
age group." He did find, however, that there \vere ''early
changes ... osteoarthritis 'vhich is commensurate with
that of this age group" and \\Thich the Doctor stated was
not unusuaL and not associated \\Tith the injury."
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The Doctor concluded from his X-ray studies:
"I found no evidence of injury in this particular patient."

"Q. Now, with relation to your ... examination
of: the muscles and so forth, what was your
finding~

A.

I found that the patient was essentially normally healthy and physically well developed
otherwise ( T -259).
(At T-260)

Q. I will ask you if the symptoms she described
to you with relation to the pain in the shoulders is a nonnal symptom from a person
suffering from a whiplash injury~
A.

It is not ... and it was my feeling that the
symptoms, the co1nplaints, and symptoms, did
not fit with the so-called whiplash injury.
(At T-281)

Q. Did you find any pain on motion in your
examination of l\Irs. Wellman~
A.

I found that when I would ask where the
pain was, that she would show me . . . tell
me where, and point to it. And I found that
by pressing on this area, that there was a
delayed reaction {ro1n the tinte I applied pressure until the respo-nse came that "that hurt."
(Emphasis added).
(At T-284)

Q.

Did you find any permanent disability in the
case of Mrs. vV ellman'
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A.

No Sir."

Bear in n1ind that nirs. Wellman testified to the
follo,ving rP~idual complaints at the time of trial:
~'I still have a headache ... where the neck
and the skull join . . . the cold night air affects
1ny neck; makes it 1nore painful." (T-132)

any vibration, riding in a car, 'valking.,
and especially if I have high heels on ( aggravates her pain) (While dancing) "The vibration
from my heels, the dancing, having my arm up,
1ny ar1n goes to sleep and also causes a spasm
1n 1ny neck and shoulder."
H

•••

'~I

still have a headache. It's there all the
ti1ne, but it gets more severe if I have over-done,
like using 1ny arms or any riding ... any vibration." T -133)
.. They (neck and shoulders) get very tight
at times and hurt me where I will stop whatever
I happen to be doing and try to relax then1, and
it doesn't always 'vork."

'"Q. In the past, say, since the beginning of this
year, has there been much of a change in
your condition, either one 'vay or the other~
A.

Yes, I believe I am getting worse." (T-124)

The plaintiff's own doctor, Dr. J. ·C. vVoodward,
:JI.D. testified:
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(T-71)

''Q. Did you find any fracture whatsoever of the
bone structure of the patient's body?
A. No.
(T-82)

Q. ". . . on your first examination, you listed
her complaints, as nausea ... you had never
been present when she vomited?
A. No.
Q. She was unable to do her housework, and of
course, you didn't know personally about
that?
A. No.
Q. Her neck was on fire, was there any way
you could verify that from an . . . objective
examination?
A.

No, that is entirely a subjective thing.

(T-83)

Q. How did you confirm she had had headaches T
A.

. .. I could confirm she 'vas certainly justified
in such a complaint....

Q. . .. she had slight difficulty with her balance?
. . . did you verify that Y
A. I didn't have her ",.alk a straight line or anything.
Q. And her vision was blurred. Did you verify
thatf
A. No I did not.
(T-84)
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Q.

The muscle in front (of the neck) did you
notice sorne spasrn in that 1

A.

Yes.

Q. Based upon these findings, you immediately
put her in the hospital?
. A.

Yes."

(T-79) The Doctor testified that he gave her about
127 therapy treatments, and that in addition, she had
had about 18 additional treatments in the hospital; for
over a period of 11f2 years (T-120).
Doctor Reed Clegg, M.D., testified that in his opinion such a lengthy treatment with therapy was not reasonable, giving his reasons as follows:
(T-261)

Referring to diathermy treatment:

". . . in my experience., if a patient isn't
responding to treatment in a few weeks, I would
figure it is not a successful treatment. I would
look for something else."
(T-262)

'" ... medicine is not as cut and dried as, perhaps, we would like it to be. And there is an eleInent of experimentation in treatment. We have
our phases of ronservative measures and we feel
since our patients respond readily to one thing
and others don't, if o·Jr first phase of treatment
isn't successful, then, to carry on over a long
period of tiine is actually har·n1ful in some cases."
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". . . some patients begin to look f onvard to
the temporary relief, and our aim is to give permanent relief, and if we carry on over a period
of months and months, they look forward to the
treatment and they are almost more convinced
that there is more wrong than actually is."
Plaintiff, unde,r Dr. Woodward's supervision, engaged in daily home traction treatments for one and
one-half years (T-121).
Dr. Clegg further testified, with relation to traction
treatments ( T -260) :
''In my particular case traction treatment
is usually the second phase of treatment and this
is usually tried for a period of a fe'v days or a
week, and if successful, then no further treatment
is indicated. If it isn't successful, then, "'"e go on
to the next stage of treatment."
('T-261)

"Q.

A.

I will ask you if it ""'onld be nonnal to continue traction, or reasonable, beyond three
weeks period~
In my estimation it \vould not be."

Certainly the above excerpts in no \Yay give a comprehensive account of all the testin1ony and evidence
relative to the plaintiff's injury, and they are not intended to do so. However, \Ye trust that enough of the
conflicting testimony has been reYie,Yed to pinpoint the
fact that there "'"as a definite joining of the issue of
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damages, and that the jury
one-sided issue to determine.

"~as

not presented 'vith a

The jury a'varded $2500.00 Special Damages, and
$~,000.00 General Da1nages. The Lo\\~er Court granted
additur of $3,000.00 arul the plaintiff has filed a consent
to the additur (R. 5-t-).
\\T e presume, therefore, that the Honorable Trial
Court and the plaintiff agree that if the jury believed

every subjective complaint by plaintiff, as well as her
overly helpful and ever believing doctor, $5,000.00 rather
than $2,000.00 is an adequate award for General Dainages.
vVhat then, if the jury believed only half of the
plaintiff's testimony concerning her subjective complaints 1 Should the verdict then be $2,500.00·~ The
ridiculosity of the attemp.t to rationalize why the verdict
should be tampered with at all, is very apparent.
This honorable Court, in Bodon vs. Suhrrntann, 8
Utah 2nd 42, 327 P. 2nd, 826 and in Schneider vs. Sttthrmann, 8 lTtah 2nd 35, 327 P. 2nd, 822, have fully reviewed
and established the basis upon 'vhich a jury verdict
should or should not be disturbed. This Court states,
in the S rh n eUler case at page 825 :
the question of dan1ages for pe·rsonal
injuries involving the intangibles of pain and
suffering, with respret to 'Yhieh reasonable minds
are apt to differ greatly, arP 1natters \\'"hieh a
H

•••
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jury is peculiarly adapted to detennine. One
of the principal merits of the jury system is that
it brings together people from different walks of
life, with distinctive points of view arising out
of their varied experiences. Bringing these different points of view to bear upon the appraisal
of such values is a method to which the parties
have a right."
Obviously, the Trial·Court was more impressed with
the plaintiff's evidence on damages, than \vas the jury.
However, it is Hornbook Law that he may not set up
his opinion against that of the jury, except under very
rigid standards established by the Supreme Court.

Test the Lower Court's conclusion that the award
was inadequate, with the language of this Honorable
Court in Jensen vs. D. & R. G. R. Conzpany, -!4 lTtah 100,
138 Pac. 1185, at 1192 :

" ... before the Court is justified (in setting
aside a verdict) it should clearly be made to
appear that the jury totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law by \Yhich the damages 'vere
to be regulated, or wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and palpable. error by rendering a
verdict so enonnous or outrageo·ns or unjust as
to be attributable to neither the charge nor the
evidence, but onl~~ to passion and prejudice."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
(the Lo\Yer l~ourt's) action may ... be
inquired into and reviPwed on an alleged abuse
of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exercise of power in ~uch rPspect. Such a review is
not a revie\\' of n question of fact, but of law....
Our po,ver to correct a plain abuse of discretion
or undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise
of po\Yer cannot be doubted."
H

\Ve submit also, that a ro1nplete review of the Record
in the case at bar, 'vill completely fail to disclose one
iota of evidence that the jury was in any way prejudiced
against the plaintiff. This Court has previously held
that the size of the ve·rdirt, standing alone, does not
shO\\~

passion or prejudic0.

ln 1-Jauly vs. 111 cCarthy ( 1947), 109 Utah 431, 184
Pae. 2nd 123, at 126 :
" ... in the mere fact that it was more than
another jury, or more than the ·Court, might
have given, or even more than the evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it "\Vas the
result of passion or prejudice .... "
no conduet on the part of the jury
evincing passion or prejudice, has been called
to our attention. The only point of complaint
is the size of the verdict."
H •••

vVe therefore submit, that the I-Ionorable Trial Judge
abused his discretion in concluding that the award was
inadequate, and that the Jury \ 7 erdict should be reinstated.
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POINT TWO
'THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN DEPRIVING THEM
OF THEIR DEFENSES AND A NEW TRIAL, IF NECESSARY, SHOULD BE HEARD ON ALL THE ISSUES.

IThe defendants' Answer alleged, as an affirmative
defense, that the accident was unavoidable (R. 6). The
Pre-Trial Order states:
"The defendants deny that they were negligent and claim as an affirmative defense that the
driver of -defendants' vehicle 'vas confronted with
a sudden peril and that the accident was unavoidable as far as the driver was concerned." (R. 10)
Despite the definite framing of the issues, the Court
refused defendants' requested instructions on foreseeability (R. 28), refused defendants' requested instruCtion on sudden peril (R. 30), and Unavoidable Accident

(R. 2.7).
We submit it as obvious, from the Courfs refusal,
that he ruled that the defense of unavoidable accident
would not be a proper defense, even if the jury "Tere to
believe the defendants' version of the accident, and the
circumstances leading up to it.

'\Te further sub1nit, although it does not appear in
the Record, that the Court 'Yas of the opinion that
lmavoidable accident is not a proper defense in an
automobile accident suit unless the facts bear out a
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conclusion that the accident, if not the same as an "Act
of God," are closely akin thereto.
ln N elso·n vs. Lot!, S1 lT~tah 265, 17 Pac. 2nd at 275,
this Court stated, in discussing the giving of an unavoidable accident instruction in an auto-pedestrian accident:
" ... the \YTiter is inclined to think the jury
\vould interpret the instruction to mean that if
they should believe the injury to the plaintiff \Yas
the result of unavoidable accident and not of
negligence on the part of the defendant, their
verdirt should bP in favor of defendant."
Again, this Court in State vs. McQuillin, 113 Utah
:2(iS, 193 Pac. 2nd, 433 ( 1948) stated:
'"His (defendant's) version of the crucial
i~sue \vas that he \vas suddenly confronted with
a situation of peril which he could not avoid.
Had the jur~T accepted such testimony as fact,
a rerdict of acquvttal U'ould have been required
in accordauce 1cith a specific instruction. of thP
Cnurt to that effect." (E1nphasis added).
\v. . e further feel, ""ith reasons not shown in the record, that the Honorable Lower Court was unduly influenced by a fairly recent pronouncen1ent by the California
Supreme ~Court. In Buti,qan vs. Yellou' Cal; Co. (1958),
49 Cal._ 2nd 652, 320 Pac. 2nd, 500, 65 ALR 2nd, 1,
\Vherein the Court reversed prior decisions and annotmced:
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"Unavoidable Accident has no place in our
pleading.... it is nothing more than a denial by
the defendant of negligence, or a contention that
his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause
of the injury."
We will let ~the Montana Supreme Court answer the
above pronouncement. In Rodoni vs. Hoskin (Montana),
355 Pac. 2nd, 296 (1960), at 299:
"We decline to follo'v the holding of Butigan
vs. Yellow Cab Co., supra, and conclude that the
holding of Lucero vs. Torres (New Mexico) is
better reasoned. It is our opinion that an instruction as to unavoidable accident could help the
jury to understand the legal concepts involved
in an ap.propriate case and would not confuse them
or hinder them in reaching a just conclusion.
However, an instruction as to unavoidable accident should be used with care and only allowed
when the facts warrant it. It might be appropriate
where there was surprise, sndden appearance and
reasonably unanticipated presence of .a pedestrian,
as 'vas stated in the Lucero case."
In Lucero vs. Torres (1960), 67 N.M. 10, 350 Pac.
2nd 1028, the New !fexico Supreme Court also rejected
the California holding in the Bntigan case, stating:
"We do not 1nean to say that every motor
vehicle accident case 'Yarrants the giving of an
unavoidable accident instruction. On the other
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hand, the VPry nature of so1ne of the 1notor vehicle
casPs, sueh a~ this, ~uggests the genuine questions
of 1ner0 accident or tmavoidable accident, giving
foundation for the instruction. A promiJnent feature 1nay be one of surprise, sudden appearance
and re~asollably u 11anticipated presence of a pedesIrian, contbined u:i~th circumstances whi~ch present
a fatr issue as to whether the faiJlure of a driver
to anticipate or sooner to guard against the ,da11r
ger or to avoid it, is consistent with a concl~tsion
of hi,s due care. In sueh cases, the trial Courts
are inclined to grant the instruction on unavoidable aecident and their action in so doing is generally approved by the Appellate ·Courts (citing
precedents from many jurisdictions. (Above elnphasis added).

In the case at bar, defendants' entire defense was
based on the defense of unavoidahle accident, of which
the elen1ents of reasonable foreseeability under the circumstances, and the

p~resence

of sudden peril from which

defendant could not extricate himself, are necessary
adjunct~.

Defendant testified that he 'vas driving 'vithin the
posted speed limit; follo,ving the cars ahead at a safe
distance; that it was wide open country where no intersecting high,vays 'vere to be expected: that he, as a
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reasonable driver, should not be required to anticipate
that a vehicle ahead would run out of gas, or even if it
did so, it would be in an unlikely area where not even
the tail lights of the cars ahead would be visible; that
when he reached the crest of the crucial hill, the nearest
vehicle was only 100 feet distant; that an opposite bound
car prevented him from swerving; that the distance of
100 feet made it impossible to stop (as verified by defendant's expert witness, Laub (T·-208-214).
Certainly, as stated in the Lucero case, supra, the
elements of "surprise", "sudden appearance", "reasonably unanticipated presence of danger", are present and
"combined with circumstances which present a fair issue
as to whether the failure of the (defendant) to anticipate
or sooner to guard against the danger or to avoid it, is
consistent with a conclusion of due care."
How could a panel of laymen, 'vith no understanding
of the above principles, and 'vith no instructions from
the Court, even be expected to take the above defenses
into consideration from the mere fact that they 'vere
instructed on the meaning of negligence 1
In 65 ALR 2nd, the annotation sun1marizes the various theories adopted by the different jurisdictions. \Y e
submit, that under any of then1~ defendants in the case
at bar, were entitled to the defense. These theories are
listed a~ follows :
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At page 32:
There must be evidence in the record which
\Vould give legal support to a finding that the
o<·enrrence ron1plained of, \Vas of the nature indicatrd in the instrurtion.

At page ..t-:3 :
There Htust be evidence before the jury that
the misadvPnture con1plained of, resulted from
so1n'e c.ause other than negligence of one of the
parties .
...:-\ t page -±8 :

The evidence 1nust present a specific theory
under \vhich the accident could have happened
not,vithstanding the fact that all the parties exercised sneh degree of care as is required by law.

At page 49:
Evidence showing the presence of any agency
or factor over "'"hich the parties had no control
and \vhich, except by the exercise of exceptiJonal
forrsi.qht, they could not have predicted.
\\T e earnestly submit, therefore, that if a new trial

1s necessary, defendants are entitled to have their defensf fairly sub1nitted to a jury.

It goes \vithout saying, that trials of la'v suits are
expensive for the litigants. Trials, Appeals, and re-trials
give rise to the layman's axiom that in a la\Y suit, "everyone lose~ but the la,,~yers," a mif'conreption ,,·hirh the
Bar has been ron1hatting for (lerades.
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It is for the above reason, that the defendants here
move this Court for an Order reinstating the jury verdict,
which in fact is in favor of the plaintiff. The parties have
had their day in Court; the jury has rendered its verdict, and the defendants, despite the several errors committed against them, are willing that the litigation be
closed.
But if it be necessary, the defendants are certainly
entitled to a fair t'rial, wherein their defenses are fairly
presented to a jury.
Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS E. MIDGLEY,
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants.
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